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Abstract
We study a simple exchange market, introduced by Gourve`s, Lesca andWilczynski (IJCAI-17), where every agent
initially holds a single object. The agents have preferences over the objects, and two agents may swap their objects
if they both prefer the object of the other agent. The agents live in an underlying social network that governs the
structure of the swaps: Two agents can only swap their objects if they are adjacent. We investigate the REACHABLE
OBJECT problem, which asks whether a given starting situation can ever lead, by means of a sequence of swaps,
to a situation where a given agent obtains a given object. Our results answer several central open questions on the
complexity of REACHABLE OBJECT. First, the problem is polynomial-time solvable if the social network is a path.
Second, the problem is NP-hard on cliques and generalized caterpillars. Finally, we establish a three-versus-four
dichotomy result for preference lists of bounded length: The problem is easy if all preference lists have length at most
three, and the problem becomes NP-hard even if all agents have preference lists of length at most four.
1 Introduction
Resource allocation under preferences is a widely-studied problem arising in areas such as artificial intelligence and
economics. We consider the case when resources are indivisible objects and each agent, having preferences over the
objects, is to receive exactly one object. In the standard scenario known as housing market, each agent initially holds
an object, and the task is to reallocate the objects so as to achieve some desirable properties, such as Pareto optimality,
fairness, or social welfare [15, 13, 1, 16]. While a large body of research in the literature takes a centralized approach
that globally controls and reallocates an object to each agent, we pursue a decentralized (or distributed) strategy where
any pair of agents may locally swap objects as long as this leads to an improvement for both of them, i.e., they both
receive a more preferred object [9].
To capture the situation where not all agents are able to communicate and swap with each other, Gourve`s et al. [11]
introduced a variant of distributed object reallocation where the agents are embedded in an underlying social network
so that agents can swap objects with each other only if (i) they are directly connected (socially tied) via the network and
(ii) will be better off after the swap. To study the distributed process of swap dynamics along the underlying network
topology, the authors analyzed various computational questions. In particular, they study the REACHABLE OBJECT
problem, which asks whether a given agent can reach a desired object via some sequence of mutually profitable swaps
between agents.
Consider the following example (initial objects are drawn in boxes). If the underlying graph is complete, object x3
is reachable for agent 1 within one swap. However, if the graph is a cycle as shown below, then to let object x3 reach
agent 1, agent 3 can swap with agent 2, and then agent 2 can swap object x3 with agent 1.
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1 : x3 ≻ x4 ≻ x1 , 2 : x1 ≻ x3 ≻ x4 ≻ x2 ,
3 : x1 ≻ x2 ≻ x4 ≻ x3 , 4 : x5 ≻ x3 ≻ x4 ,
5 : x6 ≻ x3 ≻ x5 , 6 : x4 ≻ x3 ≻ x6 ,
Showing that REACHABLE OBJECT is NP-hard when the underlying graph is a tree and presenting a simple
polynomial-time algorithm for a special restricted case on a path (where the given agent is an endpoint of the path),
the authors explicitly leave as open questions the general case on paths and other special cases (including restricted
input preferences).
In this work, we answer several open questions [11, 14] and draw a comprehensive picture of the computational
complexity of REACHABLE OBJECT.
• Our main contribution is a polynomial-time algorithm on paths (Theorem 2). This algorithm combines a multitude
of structural observations in a nontrivial way and requires a sophisticated analysis.
• Second, we show NP-hardness on complete graphs even if all preference lists have length at most four (Theorem 3).
We complement this hardness by giving a linear-time algorithm for preferences lists of length at most three (Theo-
rem 1).
• Moreover, we prove NP-hardness for generalized caterpillars (Theorem 4) and thereby narrow the gap between
tractable and intractable cases of the problem.
The NP-hardness from Theorem 3 implies that the problem is already NP-hard even if the agents are allowed to
swap without restrictions and no agent has more than three objects which she prefers to her initial one. The hardness
reduction can be adapted to also show NP-hardness for the case where the maximum vertex degree of the graph is five
and the preference lists have length at most four.
Related Work. Gourve`s et al. [11] proposed the model of distributed object reallocation via swaps on social net-
works, and showed that REACHABLE OBJECT is NP-hard on trees. Moreover, they showed polynomial-time solvabil-
ity on stars and for a special case on paths, namely when testing whether an object is reachable for an agent positioned
on an endpoint of the path. They also indicated that the problem is polynomial-time solvable on paths when the agent
and the object are at constant distance. Notably, they explicitly asked for a polynomial-time algorithm on paths in
general and describe the problem as being at the frontier of tractability, despite its simplicity. Besides REACHABLE
OBJECT, Gourve`s et al. [11] also considered the questions of reachability of a particular allocation, the REACHABLE
ASSIGNMENT problem, and existence of a Pareto-efficient allocation; both are shown to be NP-hard.
Saffidine and Wilczynski [14] studied the parameterized complexity of REACHABLE OBJECT with respect to
parameters such as the maximum vertex degree of the underlying graph or the overall number of swaps allowed in a
sequence. They showed several parameterized intractability results and also fixed-parameter tractable cases (none of
which covers our results). Notably, in their conclusion they suggested to study restrictions on the preferences (as we
do in this paper).
Other examples of recently studied problems regarding allocations of indivisible resources under social network
constraints are envy-free allocations [7, 5], Pareto-optimal allocations [12], and two-sided stable matching [3, 2]. See
the work of Gourve`s et al. [11] fore more related work.
1.1 Preliminaries
Let V = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of n agents and X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} be a set of n objects. Each agent i ∈ V has a
preference list over a subsetXi ⊆ X of the objects, which is a strict linear order onXi. This list is denoted as ≻i; we
omit the subscript if the agent is clear from the context. For two objects xj , xj′ ∈ Xi, the notation xj ≻i xj′ means
that agent i prefers xj to xj′ . A preference profile P for the agent set V is a collection (≻i)i∈V of preference lists of
the agents in V . An assignment is a bijection σ : V → X , where each agent i is assigned an object σ(i) ∈ Xi. We say
that an assignment σ admits a rational trade for two agents i, i′ ∈ V if σ(j) ≻i σ(i) and σ(i) ≻j σ(j).
We assume that the agents from V form a social network such that pairs of adjacent agents can trade their objects.
The social network is modeled by an undirected graphG = (V,E)with V being also the vertex set andE being a set of
edges on V . We say that an assignment σ admits a swap for two agents i and i′, denoted as τ={{i, σ(i)}, {i′, σ(i′)}},
if it admits a rational trade for i and i′ and the vertices corresponding to i and i′ are adjacent in the graph, i.e.,
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{i, i′} ∈ E. Accordingly, we also say that objects σ(i) (resp. σ(i′)) passes through edge {i, i′}. By definition, an
object can pass through an edge at most once.
A sequence of swaps is a sequence (σ0, σ1, . . . , σt) of assignments where for each index k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t − 1}
there are two agents i, i′ ∈ V for which σk admits a swap such that (1) σk+1(i) = σk(i′), (2) σk+1(i′) = σk(i), and
(3) for each remaining agent z ∈ V \ {i, i′} it holds that σk+1(z) = σk(z). We call an assignment σ
′ reachable from
another assignment σ if there is a sequence (σ0, σ1, . . . , σt) of swaps such that σ0 = σ and σt = σ
′. The reachability
relation defines a partial order on the set of all possible assignments. Given an initial assignment σ0, we say that an
object x ∈ X is reachable for an agent i if there is an assignment σ which is reachable from σ0 with σ(i) = x.
We study the following computational problem [11], called REACHABLE OBJECT (REACHABLE OBJECT), which
has as input an agent set V , an object set X , a preference profile for V , an undirected graph G = (V,E) on V , an
initial assignment σ0, an agent I ∈ V and an object x ∈ X , and ask whether x is reachable for I from σ0. Note that
REACHABLE OBJECT is contained in NP [11].
Proposition 1. REACHABLE OBJECT is in NP.
Proof. Since each object can pass through each edge at most once it follows that each reachable assignment uses a
different edge to swap objects. Hence, a certificate for a REACHABLE OBJECT instance with n agents is a sequence
of swaps where each object appears at most O(n2) times, i.e. the length of the sequence is O(n3).
We consider simple undirected graphs G = (V,E) containing vertices V and edges E ⊆
(
V
2
)
. We assume the
reader to be familiar with basic graph classes such as paths, cycles, trees, and complete graphs (cliques) [10]. A
caterpillar is a tree such that removing all leaves yields a path (i.e, all vertices are within distance at most one of a
central path). We call the edges to the leaves attached to the central path hairs of length 1. A generalized caterpillar
has hairs of length h ≥ 1.
2 Preferences of Length at Most Three
In this section, we provide a linear-time algorithm for REACHABLE OBJECT in the special case of preferences with
length at most three. The main idea is to reduce REACHABLE OBJECT to reachability in directed graphs. The approach
is described in Algorithm 1. Take the example from the introduction, and delete object x1 from agent 3’s preference
list and object x3 from agent 2’ preference list. Then, our algorithm finds the following swap sequence for object x3
to reach agent 1: 4 ↔ 3, 3 ↔ 2, 2 ↔ 1, 4 ↔ 5, 5 ↔ 6, 6 ↔ 1; here “i ↔ j” means that agent i swaps with agent j
over the objects currently held by them.
Throughout this section, we assume that each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, when initially holding object xi, i.e., σ0(i) =
xi, has either two or three objects in her preference list; we can ignore those agents who only have one object in their
respective preference lists because they will never trade with someone else. We aim to determine whether object xn,
which is initially held by agent n, is reachable for agent 1. To ease the reasoning, we define an equivalent and succinct
notion of swap sequences, which only focuses on the relevant swaps. Let τ = {{i, x}, {j, y}} be a swap for which an
assignment σ admit. Then, we use the notation σ/τ to denote the assignment that results from σ by performing the
swap τ . In an overloading manner, we say that a sequence φ = (τ1, τ2, . . . , τm) of swaps is a valid swap sequence for
some start assignment σ0 if there exists a sequence of swaps (σ0, σ1, . . . , σm) (see Subsection 1.1) such that for each
z ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, it holds that σz = σz−1/τz .
We first observe a property which allows us to exclusively focus on a specific valid swap sequence where each
swap involves swapping object xq , if object xq reaches agent 1 during the swap sequence.
Lemma 1. Let φ = (τ1, τ2, . . . , τm) be a valid swap sequence for σ0 such that the agent 1 obtains xn in the last swap.
Consider two objects xp and xq . If φ contains a swap τr with τr = {{1, xp}, {k, xq}} (for some agent k), then let
φ′ = (τ ′1, τ
′
2, . . . , τ
′
s) be a subsequence of the prefix φ0 = (τ1, τ2, . . . , τr) of φ, up to (including) τr, that consists of
exactly those swaps τ from φ0 with {kτ , xq} ∈ τ for some agent kτ , Define as+1 = p and az , 1 ≤ z ≤ s, such that
{az, xq} ∈ τ ′z . The following holds.
(i) τ ′s = τr.
(ii) a1 = q.
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(iii) For each z ∈ {1, . . . , s} agent az prefers xaz+1 to xq .
(iv) For each z ∈ {2, . . . , s} agent az has preference list xaz+1 ≻ xq ≻ xaz .
(v) φ′ is a valid swap sequence for σ′0, where σ
′
0(i) = σ0(i) for all i /∈ {1, p} while σ
′
0(1) = xp and σ
′
0(p) = x1.
(vi) If agent 1 prefers xn to xq , then no agent az , 3 ≤ z ≤ s, contains object xn in her preference list.
Proof. Statement (i): By definition, the last swap τr in φ0 contains {j, xq} for some agent j, since φ′ contains exactly
those swaps from φ0 that involves swapping object xq , it follows that the last swap in φ
′ must be τr.
Statement (ii) holds because agent q initially holds object xq and thus, in order to make object xq reach agent 1,
agent q is the first agent to give away object xq .
Now, we turn to statement (iii). Note that all agents az are distinct because by the definition of rational trades no
agent will give away the same object xq more than once. We show statement (iii) by induction on z, 1 ≤ z ≤ s,
starting with z = s.
First of all, by the first statement, we know that τ ′s = τr, i.e, in this swap τ
′
s agent as swaps with agent 1 over
objects xq and xp = xas+1 . Since τ
′
s is also a rational trade, this means that agent as must prefer object xas+1 to
object xq .
For the induction assumption, let us assume that for each i ≥ z, agent ai prefers xai+1 to xq . Now, we
consider agent az−1, and we aim to show that az−1 prefers xaz to xq . By definition, we know that τ
′
z−1 =
{{az−1, xq}, {az, y}} for some object y, i.e., agent az−1 gives object xq to agent az in order to obtain another object y.
Thus, agent az−1 must prefer y to xq and agent az must prefer xq to y. Since each agent has at most three objects in
her preference list and since by our induction assumption we know that az already prefers xaz+1 to xq we infer that
that y is the initial object of agent az , that is, y = xaz .
Next, to show statement (iv), let us re-examine the preferences of agents az , 1 ≤ z ≤ s implied by statement (iii).
Since each az , 1 ≤ z ≤ s, prefers xaz+1 to xq , the preference list of each agent az , 2 ≤ z ≤ s, is xaz+1 ≻ xq ≻ xaz ;
again, recall that each agent has at most three objects in her preference list.
Now, we show that φ′ is a valid swap sequence for σ′0, i.e., there exists a swap sequence (ρ0, ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρs), a
sequence of assignments, such that for ρ0 = σ
′
0 and for each z ∈ {1, . . . , s} it holds that ρz = ρz−1/τ
′
z . We prove
this by showing the following
(1) σ′0 is an assignment and admits swap τ
′
1.
(2) for each z ∈ {1, . . . , s−1} if σ′z−1 is an assignment and admits swap τ
′
z , then σ
′
z := σ
′
z−1/τ
′
z is also an assignment
and admits swap τ ′z+1,
(3) σ′s := σ
′
s−1/τ
′
s is an assignment.
Clearly, σ′0 is an assignment and admits swap τ
′
1, which is τ
′
1 = {{a1, xq}, {a2, xa2}}. This means that σ
′
1, defined
as σ′1 := σ
′
0/τ
′
1, is an assignment. Now, consider z ∈ {1, . . . , s − 2}, and assume that σ
′
z−1 is an assignment and
admits swap τz , which is τz = {{az, xq}, {az+1, xaz+1}}. Thus, σ
′
z := σ
′
z−1/τ
′
z is an assignment. By the definitions
of T := {τ ′1, . . . , τ
′
z}, we infer that σ
′
z(az+1) = xq and σ
′
z(az+2) = xaz+2 ; the latter holds because no swap from
T has involved agent az+2. Thus, by the preference lists of az+1 and az+2 it holds that σ
′
z admits swap τ
′
z+1, which
is τ ′z+1 = {{az+1, xq}, {az+2, xaz+2}}. Finally, we obtain that σ
′
s−1 := σ
′
s−2/τs−1 is an assignment such that
σ′s−1(as−1) = xq and σ
′
s−1(1) = xas+1 = xp. By the preference list of agent 1 and as−1, it is clear that σ
′
s−1 admits
swap τ ′s. Define σ
′
s = σ
′
s−1/τs and it is clear it is an assignment. Concluding, φ
′ is a valid swap sequence for σ′0.
Finally, we show statement (vi). Assume that agent 1 prefers object xn to object xq , implying that xn 6= xq . We
assume that s− 1 ≥ 4 as otherwise the set {3, . . . , s− 1} is empty and we are done with the statement. Suppose, for
the sake of contradiction, that some agent az with 3 ≤ z ≤ s−1 has object xn in her preference list. By the preference
list of az we infer that the object xn is either xaz or xaz+1 because xn 6= xq . If xn = xaz , then after the swap τ
′
z ,
agent az−1 will obtain xn, which is her most preferred object—a contradiction to agent 1 receiving object xn after φ
′.
If xn = xaz+1 , then after the swap τ
′
z+1, agent az will obtain xn, which is her most preferred object—a contradiction
to agent 1 receiving object xn after φ
′.
Now, we are ready to give the main algorithm for the case where the length of the preference list of each agent is
bounded by three based on solving reachability in a directed graph (Algorithm 1).
Theorem 1. REACHABLE OBJECT for preference list length at most three can be solved in O(n+m) time, wherem
is the number of edges in the underlying graph.
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Algorithm 1: Algorithm for REACHABLE OBJECT with preference list length at most three.
Input: Agent set V with preference lists (≻i)i∈V over object set X , and the underlying graph (V,E)
1 D :=(V,F ) with F :={(i, j) |{i, j} ∈ E ∧ xj ≻i xn ∧ xn ≻j xj}.
2 ifD admits a directed path P from n to 1 then
3 return yes
4 if xn ≻1 xw ≻1 x1 for some xw 6= xn then D1 := (V, F1) with F1 := {(i, j) | {i, j} ∈ E ∧ xj ≻i xw ∧ xw ≻j xj}.
5 foreach Directed path P1 = (w, n, a1, . . . , as, 1) from w to 1 inD1 such that the first arc on P1 is (w, n) do
6 D2 := D − {a1, . . . , as}+ {(j, 1) | xw ≻j xn}
7 if D2 admits a directed path P2 from n to 1 such that the first arc on P2 is (n, w) then return yes
8 foreach Directed path P1 = (w, a1, . . . , as, 1) from w to 1 inD1 such that the first arc on P1 is not (w, n), i.e., a1 6= n do
9 D3 := D − {w, a1, . . . , as}+ {(j, 1) | xw ≻j xn}
10 if D3 admits a directed path P3 from n to 1 such that the first arc on P3 is not (n,w) then return yes
11
12 return no
Proof sketch. We claim that Algorithm 1 solves our problem in linear time. Assume that object xn is reachable for
agent 1, i.e., there exists a valid swap sequence φ = (τ1, τ2, . . . , τm) for σ0 such that τm = {{1, x}, {j, xn}} for some
object x which exists in the preference list of 1 and some agent j that has xn in her preference list. There are two cases
for x: either x = x1 or x 6= x1. If x = x1, then using xp = x1 and xq = xn, the sequence φ′ as defined in Lemma 1
is a valid swap sequence for σ′0 with σ
′
0 = σ0. By the properties in Lemma 1(iv), graph D as constructed in Line 1
must contain a path from n to 1. Thus, by Line 2 our algorithm returns yes.
If x 6= x1, implying that the preference list of agent 1 is xn ≻ xw ≻ x1 for some object xw such that x = xw,
then φ has a swap τr such that τr = {{1, x1}, {k, xw}} for some agent k. By Lemma 1 (using xp = x1 and xq = xw),
the sequence φ′ = (τ ′1, . . . , τ
′
s) as defined in Lemma 1 is a valid swap sequence for σ
′
0 with σ
′
0 = σ0. Let az ,
1 ≤ z ≤ s, be the agents such that {az, xw} ∈ τ ′z . By Lemma 1(ii), we know that τ
′
1 = {{w, xw}, {a2, xa2}} =
{{a1, xa1}, {a2, xa2}}.
There are two cases for a2: either a2 = n or a2 6= n. If a2 = n, then by the properties in Lemma 1(iv), it
follows that φ′ defines a directed path (a1, a2), . . . , (as−1, as), (as, 1) in D1 (Line 4) with (a1, a2) = (w, n). By
σ′0 and Lemma 1(iv), we have that (a1, a2), (a2, a3), . . . , (as−1, as), (as, 1) is a directed path in graph D1 as defined
in Line 4 such that (a1, a2) = (w, n) so that the if condition from Line 5 holds. By Lemma 1(vi), no agent from
{a3, a4, . . . , as} is involved in a swap from φ which includes xn.
By the above properties of τm and φ, it follows that using xp = xw and xq = xn, the sequence φ
′′ =
(ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρt) as defined in Lemma 1 is a valid swap sequence for σ
′′
0 with σ
′′
0 (1) = xw, σ
′′
0 (w) = x1, and for
all i /∈ {1, w}, σ′′0 (i) = σ0(i). Recall that φ
′ contains exactly those swaps from φ0 which involve swapping ob-
ject xw. Thus, it must hold that ρ1 = τ
′
1. Let bz, 1 ≤ z ≤ t, be the agents such that {bz, xn} ∈ ρz . Then, b1 = n
and b2 = w and no agent from {b3, . . . , bt} is from {a3, . . . , as}. Thus, by σ′′0 and Lemma 1(iv), we have that
(b1, b2), (b2, b3), . . . , (bt−1, bt), (bt, 1) is a directed path in graphD2 as defined in Line 6 such that (b1, b2) = (n,w).
Indeed, by Line 7, our algorithm returns yes.
Now, we turn to the other case, namely, a2 6= n. Again, by the properties of τm and φ, it follows that, using
xp = xw and xq = xn, the sequence φ
′′ = (ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρt) as defined in Lemma 1 is a valid swap sequence for σ
′′
0
with σ′′0 (1) = xw, σ
′′
0 (w) = x1, and for all i /∈ {1, w}, σ
′′
0 (i) = σ0(i). Let bz , 1 ≤ z ≤ t, be the agents such that
{bz, xn} ∈ ρz .
We aim to show that no swap from φ that involves swapping object xn will involve agent az , 1 ≤ z ≤ s, i.e.,
{a1, . . . , as} ∩ {b1, . . . , bt} = ∅. By φ′0 and the properties in Lemma 1(iv), it follows that φ
′ defines a directed
path (a1, a2), . . . , (as−1, as), (as, 1) in D1 (Line 4) such that a2 6= n. By Lemma 1(iv) and Lemma 1(vi), no agent
from {a2, a3, a4, . . . , as} is involved in any swap from φ which includes object xn. Neither will agent a1 be involved
in any swap from φ which includes object xn because of the following. After swap τ
′
1 agent a1 obtains object xa2
which is not xn, so if she would be involved in swapping xn, then she would obtain xn as her most preferred object
and never give away xn. Thus, indeed we have {a1, . . . , as}∩{b1, . . . , bt} = ∅. By σ′′0 and Lemma 1(iv), we have that
(b1, b2), (b2, b3), . . . , (bt−1, bt), (bt, 1) is a directed path in graphD3 as defined in Line 9 such that (b1, b2) 6= (n,w).
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· · ·
I I + 1 I + 2
· · ·
n− 1 n
x
1 2 · · · n− I
Figure 1: An example of a path where the name of the agent is denoted below its vertex. The target object x is the initial object of n
and is depicted above the corresponding vertex n. The edges to the “right” of I are enumerated in order to define types of objects.
Indeed, by Line 10, our algorithm returns yes.
For the converse direction, if our algorithm return yes, then one of the three lines 2, 7, 10, returns yes. It is not hard
to check that the corresponding constructed path(s) indeed define(s) a desired valid swap sequence. As for the running
time, our algorithm constructed at most four directed graphs D,D1, D2, and D3, each of them with O(n) arcs. We
only show how to construct D in O(n + m) time, the construction for D1 is analogous and graphs D2 and D3 are
derived fromD.
To construct D = (V, F ), we go through each edge {i, j} with i 6= n and j 6= n in the underlying graph and do
the following in O(1) time; we tackle agent n separately.
• Check whether the preference list of i is xj ≻ xn ≻ xi and j prefers xn over xj . If so, we add the edge (i, j).
• Check whether the preference list of j is xi ≻ xn ≻ xj and i prefers xn over xi. If so, we add the edge (j, i).
Now, we consider agent n. For each object xj (there are at most two of them) that agent n prefers to her initial
object xn, we do the following in O(m) time.
• Check whether {n, j} ∈ E.
• Check whether j prefers xn to xj .
Add the arc (n, j) to D only if the above two checks are positive. In this way, each vertex from V \ {n} has at most
two in-arcs and at most one out-arc and vertex n has at most two out-arcs but no in-arcs. Thus, |F | ∈ O(n).
For each of the three graphs, each with O(n) arcs, checking whether the specific path stated in the corresponding
line exists can be done in O(n) time. In total, the algorithm runs in O(n +m) time.
3 Paths
In this section we prove that REACHABLE OBJECT on paths is solvable inO(n4) time. This answers an open question
by Gourve`s et al. [11]. The proof consists of two phases. In the first phase, we analyze sequences of swaps in paths
and observe a crucial structure regarding possible edges along which a pair of objects can be traded. In the second
phase, we use this structure to reduce REACHABLE OBJECT on paths to 2-SAT.
Let P = ({1, 2, . . . , n}, {{i, i+ 1} | 1 ≤ i < n}) be a path, and w.l.o.g. let σ0(n) = x (see Figure 1). Note that
if there are some agents n+ 1, . . ., then their initially assigned objects can never be part of any swap that is necessary
for x to reach I . If such a swap was necessary, then there would be a swap that moves x away from I , that is, to an
agent with a higher index, and therefore the agent that gave away x now possesses an object that she prefers over x
and she will never accept x again. Thus, object x could never reach I .
In the following,“an object y moves to the right” means that object y is given to an agent with a higher index than
the agent that currently holds it. An object z is “to the left (resp. right) of some other object a” when the agent that
initially holds object z has a smaller index than the agent that initially holds object a.
We start with a helpful lemma that will be used multiple times. It states that for each pair of objects there is at
most one edge along which these two objects can be swapped in order to pass each other.
Lemma 2. For each agent i and each two distinct objects object w and y there exists at most one edge, denoted as
{j, j+1}, such that for each sequence ξ of swaps the following statement holds: If after ξ agent i holds object w, and
if objects w and y are swapped in ξ, then objects w and y are swapped over the edge {j, j + 1}. Deciding whether
such an edge exists and computing it if it exists takes O(n) time.
Proof. Let a be the agent that initially holds y and let c be the agent that initially holds w. Assume without loss of
generality that a < c. By the definition of rational trades, no agent takes an object back that she gave away before.
Hence, if w and y are swapped at some point, then they need to travel “towards and never away from each other” in
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Case 1: · · ·
e = a
y
· · ·
b
· · ·
c
w
y
a
Case 2: · · ·
e = i
· · ·
b
· · ·
c
w
Figure 2: The two cases considered in the proof of Lemma 2. The agent colored in black, b, prefer y to w while “dotted” agents
prefer w over y. The agent e in the proof is colored gray and also prefers w over y.
1
a
2
b
I
c
4
d
5
x
1 2
1 : b ≻ a , 2 : c ≻ a ≻ b , I : x ≻ a ≻ c ,
4 : a ≻ c ≻ x ≻ d , 5 : d ≻ x .
Figure 3: An example for types (Definition 3). Object b can never be swapped with x before x reaches agent I , and therefore its
type is 0. The type of object d is 2 and the type of a and c is 1.
the path before the swap occurs. Thus, we only need to consider the set of agentsM = {d | a ≤ d ≤ c} as potential
candidates for j and j + 1. We first find an agent e that has to get object y before she can get object w. We consider
two cases: Either i ∈M or i /∈M (see Figure 2).
Case 1: i /∈ M . That is, i < a because w and y are swapped before w reaches i, and M contains all agents on a
connected subpath including agent c. Then, w needs to pass agent a at some point in order for w to reach i. Let e = a.
Case 2: i ∈ M . That is, agent i is initially between objects w and y. Since we are only interested in sequences of
swaps until agent i gets object w, we can assume w.l.o.g. that j ≥ i. We assume further that agent i prefers w over y
as she would otherwise not accept w after giving away y. Thus, agent i is the agent e we are looking for.
Next we will show that there is only one edge to the right of agent e where w and y can be swapped. Consider the
agent b ∈M such that all agents in the setMb = {d | e < d < b} prefer w over y and b prefers y over w. Note that b
cannot obtain object y before object w as she would not acceptw at any future point in time and thereforew will never
pass b. Thus, it holds that j + 1 ≤ b. Any agent inMb prefers w over y and therefore would not agree on swapping w
for y. Thus, it holds that j + 1 ≥ b and therefore j + 1 = b.
Observe that the agent b can be computed in linear time and is always the only candidate for being agent j + 1 we
are looking for.
We next define the type of an object. The type of an object is represented by the index of the edge where the object
can possibly be swapped with x.
Definition 3. Define the index of each edge {I+ t− 1, I+ t} to be t, t ≥ 1. For each object y, if y and x can possibly
be swapped at some edge (see Lemma 2), then let the type of y be the index of this edge. Otherwise, the type of y is 0.
Figure 3 shows an example of types. Note that it is not possible that the edge found by Lemma 2 has no index as we
can assume that agent I prefers object x over all other objects. Clearly, in every sequence of swaps in which agent I
gets x, object x is swapped exactly once with an object of each type≥ 1.
Assume that z the object of type 1 that agent I swaps last to get object x. Observe that since the underlying graph is a
path, each object that initially starts between objects x and z must be swapped with exactly one of these two objects in
every sequence of swaps that ends with agent I exchanging z for x. In the algorithm we will try all objects of type 1
and check whether at least one of them yields a solution. This only adds a factor of n to the running time. Observe that
object z needs to reach I from the left and hence Lemma 2 applies for z and I . We will use this fact to show that there
are at most two possible candidate objects of each type. For this, we first define the subtype of an object. Roughly
speaking, the subtype of y encodes whether y is left or right of the object of the same type that shall move to the right.
Definition 4. For each object y of type α > 1, let e be the edge where y and z can possibly be swapped. If e does
not exist, then set the type of all other objects of type α to 0 and set the subtype of y to ℓ. If e exists, then let h be
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a
2
b
3
c
4
d
5
· · ·
1 : a ≻ z , 2 : c ≻ b ≻ z ≻ a , 3 : z ≻ c ≻ b ,
4 : d ≻ z ≻ b ≻ , c , 5 : z ≻ d .
Figure 4: An example for subtypes (Definition 4). Preference lists only contain the objects that are depicted in the picture. Assume
that objects a, b, c, and d are all of type 2. If c has to be swapped with z at any point, then it is required to move once to the left
before being swapped with z as agent 3 prefers z over c. Thus, the value h as defined in Definition 4 is 1. One can verify that c has
subtype r. Agents a, b, and d have subtype ℓ.
the number of edges between the agent a initially holding y and the edge e; if e is incident to a, then let h = 0. If
α ≤ h+ 1, then the subtype of y is “r” (for right); otherwise the subtype of y is “ℓ” (for left).
Figure 4 shows an example of subtypes. Notice that if the edge e exists, then it is unique as stated in Lemma 2.
The following auxiliary result helps to identify at most two relevant objects of each type (one of each subtype).
Lemma 5. Consider an object y that is swapped with object z before object z reaches agent I , let {i − 1, i} be the
edge where object z and y are swapped, and let j be the agent that initially holds y. Then, for each object w it holds
that (i) if w is swapped with y before y is swapped with z then w has type from {2, 3, . . . , j − i+ 1}, and (ii) if w has
a type from {2, 3, . . . , j − i+ 1} and is swapped with object x, then it has to be swapped with object y before y and z
can be swapped.
Proof. Let y be an object that is initially held by some agent j and that is swapped with z before x and z are swapped.
Then, y has to be moved to the left and we can use Lemma 2 to compute a unique edge {i − 1, i} at which y and z
are swapped. Throughout this proof we will implicitly use the fact that the relative order of all objects that move to
the right can never change as otherwise an agent would regain an object she already gave away before and hence she
would have made an irrational trade.
Statement (i): Let w be an object that is swapped with y before y is swapped with z. Thenw has to be moved to the
right. Suppose towards a contradiction that w has type at least j− i+2; note that no object can have type 1 as object z
will be the type-1 object. Then, either there are at least j − i other objects (of types 2, 3, . . . j − i + 1) that initially
start between y and z and that are moved to the right or there is a type α ∈ [2, j − i+ 1] such that no object of type α
is initially between y and z and that is moved to the right. In the former case, there are at least j − i + 1 objects that
are initially between y and z and that move to the right and hence y is moved to agent i− 1 before it can be swapped
with z, a contradiction. In the latter case, note that after objects w and x are swapped, there is some α ∈ [2, j − i+ 1]
such that no object of type α is between x and z and that is moved to the right and hence x can not be swapped over
the edge {I + α− 1, I + α}, again a contradiction. Thus, w has a type at most j − i+ 1.
Statement (ii): Letw have a type α ∈ [2, j−i+1] and let w be moved to the right. Suppose towards a contradiction
that w and y are not swapped. Since y is moved to the left and w is moved to the right, w has to start to the right of y.
Since the relative order of objects moving to the right cannot change and since object x is swapped with all objects
moving to the right in decreasing order of their types, it follows that all objects that move to the right are initially
ordered by their type. Hence, there are only objects of type β ∈ [2, α − 1] that initially start between w and z and
that move to the right. Since y is initially left of w, it holds that there are at most j − i − 1 objects that are initially
between y and z and that are moved to the right. Thus, y can only reach agent i+1 before it has to be swapped with z.
Since the edge computed by Lemma 2 is unique, y and z cannot be swapped over {i, i+ 1}, a contradiction. Thus, w
and y have to be swapped before y and z can be swapped.
Subtypes help to exclude all but two objects of each type.
Lemma 6. Given objects x and z, there is an O(n2)-time preprocessing that excludes all but at most two objects of
each type α ≥ 2 as potential candidates for being swapped with x.
Proof. Consider a type α ≥ 2 and all objects of type α. Compute the subtype of each of these objects. Exactly one of
them is swapped to the right and all others have to be swapped with z at some point. From Lemma 2, we know that
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all the objects that are swapped to the left have a specific edge where they can possibly be swapped with z. If such an
edge does not exist for some object, then we know that this object has to move to the right and we can change the type
of all other objects of type α to 0. Note that there is no solution if such an edge does not exist for multiple objects of
the same type.
If such an edge exists for each object of type α, then we count the number h of swaps to the left that are needed
for each object y of type α to reach the edge at which it can be swapped with z. Note that by Lemma 5 each of these
swaps happens with an object of type β ∈ [2, h+ 1]. If these types include α, that is, α ≤ h+ 1, then y has subtype r
and otherwise it has subtype ℓ. If the subtype of y is r and if y is moved to the left, then by Lemma 5 y has to be right
of the object of type α that moves to the right. Again by Lemma 5, if y is moved to the left and has subtype ℓ, then y
has to be left of the object of type α that is moved to the right.
Consider the case where the objects of a given type are not ordered by their subtype (from left to
right: ℓ, ℓ, . . . , ℓ, r, r, . . . , r). Then, for each object w of type α, there exists an object of type α and subtype r to
the left or an object of type α and subtype ℓ to the right. In Figure 4, for w = d there is c with subtype r left of w
and for w ∈ {a, b, c} there is object d of subtype ℓ right of w. Thus, if we try to send w to the right, then the number
of swaps to the left of some other object of type α (objects c or d in Figure 4) does not match the number of swaps
needed to reach the edge where the objects can be swapped with z. Hence, there is no solution.
Now consider the case where the objects are ordered by subtype as indicated above. By the same argument as
above there are only two possible objects of type α that can possibly travel to the right: The last object of subtype ℓ
and the first object of subtype r. We can therefore set the type of all other objects of type α to 0.
Let nα be the number of objects of type α. Since the subtype for each object of type α can be computed in O(n)
time, we obtain that the described preprocessing takes O(nα · n) time for type α. After having computed the subtype
of each object of type α, we iterate over all these objects and find the two specified objects or determine that the
objects are not ordered by subtype in O(n) time. Hence the overall running time is in O(
∑
α>1(nα · n)) ⊆ O(n
2).
The inclusion holds since each object (except for x) has exactly one type.
We are now in a position to present the heart of our proof. We will show how to choose an object of each typeα ≥ 1
such that moving those objects to the right and all other objects to the left leads to a swap sequence such that agent I
gets object x in the end. Once we have chosen the correct objects, we can compute the final position of each object in
linear time and then use the fact then any swap sequence that only sends objects “in the correct” direction is a valid
sequence since the relative order of all objects that travel to the left (respectively to the right) can never change. Such
a selection leads to a solution if and only if for each pair of objects such that the right one moves to the left and the
left one moves two the right, the two endpoints of the edge where they are to be swapped can agree on this swap. We
mention that these insights were also used in Algorithm 1 by Gourve`s et al. [11].
We will next focus on objects of type 0. Using Lemma 2, we can compute for each object y of type 0 the edge
where y and z can be swapped. If such an edge does not exist, then there is no solution. Hence, we can again compute
the number h of objects between y and z that need to move to the right. If any object w which is to the right of y has a
type β ≤ h+1 or any object w′ to the left of y has a type β′ > h+1, then by Lemma 5 these object w and w′ cannot
be moved to the right and hence we can set its type to 0. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that there is an object y
of type 0 between two objects v, w, both of type α. Then, we can either set the type of w (if α ≤ h + 1) or of v
(if α > h + 1) to 0. Hence, there is no object of type 0 between two objects of the same type and we are guaranteed
that z can be swapped with all objects of type 0 regardless of which objects of each type are moved to the right.
Hence, it remains to study swaps (i) of z with objects of type at least 2 that move to the left, (ii) of objects that
move to the right and objects of type at least 2 that move to the left, and (iii) of objects of type 0 and objects moving
to the right. Before doing so, we need to define the last ingredient for our proof: blocks.
Definition 7. A block is a minimal subsetB ⊆ X of objects that contains all objects of all types in some interval [α, β]
with 2 ≤ α ≤ β such that all objects in B are initially hold by agents on a subpath of the input path (see Figure 5).
We first prove that blocks are well defined and that each object of type η ≥ 2 is contained in exactly one block.
Lemma 8. Each object of type η ≥ 2 is contained in exactly one block, if there is no object of a higher type to its left,
then this object has the highest type in its block, and all blocks can be computed in linear time.
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z 2ℓ 3ℓ 2r 4ℓ 3r 4r 0 5ℓ 5r
· · ·
Figure 5: An example of blocks (Definition 7). The left block contains all objects of type 2, 3 and 4 and the right block contains
the two objects of type 5.
Proof. For any type δ, let δℓ be the object of type δ and subtype ℓ and analogously let δr be the object of type δ and
subtype r. Recall that δℓ is left of δr. If there is only one object w of type δ, then we say that δℓ = δr = w. Observe
that the objects in a block are initially hold by agents of a subpath of the input path and that the subpaths of different
blocks do not intersect. The “first” or “leftmost” block with respect to this subpath has to start with 2ℓ as otherwise
the leftmost object of the block (again with respect to its subpath) could never be chosen and hence its type could be
set to 0. Analogously, the objects of a block with interval [α, β] have to start with αℓ and end with βr, as otherwise
the leftmost (respectively rightmost) object could never be chosen since there is no object of type α (of type β) to its
left (respectively to its right) and its type is larger than α (less than β).
We will start with the block that contains type 2 in its interval and show that there is a unique type γ such that
the block has interval [2, γ]. Applying the same argumentation iteratively with γ + 1, we show that each object of
type η > 2 is contained in exactly one block: Consider the smallest type α that is not yet shown to be in a block and
consider the objects αℓ and αr. If these two objects are the same or are initially hold by adjacent agents, then these
object(s) are a block with interval [α, α] and since blocks are minimal sets of objects, they are not part of any other
block. If initially there is an object between αℓ and αr, then it cannot be objects of type η < α. This holds, since
it cannot be an object of type 0 as shown above, it cannot be z as z is the leftmost object that we consider and by
assumption it cannot be an object of type η ∈ [2, α− 1]. The right neighbor of αℓ therefore has to be (α + 1)ℓ since
if it was of type η > α + 1, then it could never be chosen as there is no object of type α + 1 to its left and hence its
type could be set to 0. Analogously, note that (α + 1)r has to initially be right of object αr as otherwise object αr
could never be chosen. Hence we can continue with the objects (α+1)ℓ and (α+1)r. Again, there can be no objects
of type η < α between them. If there are only objects of type α between them, then the block has interval [α, α + 1]
and otherwise we can continue with objects (α+ 2)ℓ and (α+ 2)r and so on. Note that this chain stops exactly at the
first type η where all objects of a higher type than η are initially right of ηr and this happens at latest at δr, where δ
describes the largest type. Since we need only a constant amount of computation for each object, all blocks can be
computed in linear time.
We next prove that for each block there are only two possibilities to choose objects of each type in the block that
can lead to a solution. We start with an intermediate lemma.
Lemma 9 (⋆). If in a block with interval [α, β], we decide for some type γ ∈ [α, β] to send object γr to the right, then
we need to send all objects δr of type δ ∈ [γ, β] to the right.
Proof. Let B be a block with interval [α, β] and let γ ∈ [α, β] be some type and assume that γr is to be sent to the
right. By Lemma 8, we know that unless γ = β, it holds that (γ + 1)ℓ is to the left of γr and can therefore not be
sent to the right. Thus, we also have to move (γ + 1)r to the right. This argument applies iteratively for all types
in [γ, β].
Based on Lemma 9, we prove the following.
Lemma 10. There are at most two selections of objects in a block with interval [α, β] that can lead to I getting x.
These selections can be computed in O(n·(β − α+ 1)) time.
Proof. Let B be a block with interval [α, β]. There are only two possibilities for type α: Either αℓ is moved to the
right or αr is moved to the right. If αr is moved to the right, then Lemma 9 states that we need to move δr to the right
for all δ ∈ [α, β]. If we want to move αℓ to the right, then we know the final destination of αℓ and that αℓ and αr have
to swap at some point. We can therefore use Lemma 2 to compute the edge where αℓ and αr are swapped. From this
we can compute the number h of objects between αℓ and αr that have to be moved to the right and hence we know
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that they have to be of types α + 1, α + 2, . . . , α + h. Note that no object of subtype r between αℓ and αr can be
moved to the right.
Thus, there are two possibilities: The number h equals the number of objects of subtype r between αℓ and αr
or not. In the former case we know that h objects of subtype ℓ have to be moved to the right and then an object of
subtype r (the respective object of subtype ℓ is to the left of αr). By Lemma 9, all remaining objects of subtype r
have to be moved to the right. In the latter case we can consider the highest type η that occurs between αℓ and αr.
If η = β, then we have to only move objects of subtype ℓ to the right and otherwise we can next look at the objects
between ηℓ and ηr and apply the very same argument as before. Thus, there is only the choice at the very beginning
whether to move αℓ or αr to the right. One possibility is to only move objects of subtype r to the right and the other
can be computed in O(n · (β − α+ 1)) time as there are O(β − α+ 1) types in B and for each type we can compute
the possible swap position in O(n) time. All other computations can be done in constant time per object.
For both possible selections (see Lemma 10), we can determine in O((β−α+1)2 ·n) time, whether this selection
is consistent, i.e., any pair of objects in this block that needs to be swapped at some point can in fact be swapped,
by computing for each pair of objects where they should be swapped in O(n) time using Lemma 2 (observe that we
know the final destination of the object moving to the right) and checking whether the two endpoints of this edge can
agree on this. We further require that this selection is not in conflict with objects of type 0 in the sense that all of the
objects that we move to the right can be swapped with all objects of type 0. Observe that objects of type 0 are initially
not located between objects of the same type and therefore we know exactly where the objects of the selection and the
objects of type 0 are swapped independent of the selection for other blocks.
By the definition of types, we know that x can always be swapped with the objects we moved to the right. Consider
a possible selection of objects from some block B to move to the right. All other objects are moved to the left and
hence have to be swapped with z at some edge. Since we know the number of objects to the left of B that are moved
to the right (we do not know which objects these are but we know their number and types by the definition of blocks),
we can compute for each of them the edge where they need to swap with z. If the swap of the considered object and z
is not rational for the two endpoints of this edge, then the selection can never lead to a situation where I swaps z for x
and we can therefore ignore this selection.
Thus, it only remains to find a selection for each block such that the objects that are moved to the right and the
objects that are moved to the left can be swapped (if the former one is initially to the left of the latter one). We say that
these selections are compatible.
Definition 11. LetB andC be two blocks with intervals [α, β] and [γ, δ], respectively, and let β < γ. Let sB (resp. sC)
be a selection of objects from B (respectively C) to move to the right. We say that sB and sC are compatible if for
all b ∈ sB and all c ∈ C \ sC , the swap of b and c is rational for the two agents at the (unique) position where b and c
can be swapped. Otherwise, we say that sB and sC are in conflict.
Observe that we can compute a unique pair of agents that can possibly swap b and c since we know how many objects
between b and c are moved to the right. This number is the sum of objects in sB right of b, objects in sC left of c, and
γ−β− 1. Hence, computing whether these two selections are compatible takesO(|B| · |C| ·n) time as the agents can
be computed in constant time per pair of objects and checking whether these agents can agree on swapping takesO(n)
time. It remains to find a selection for each block such that all of these selections are pairwise compatible. We solve
this problem using a reduction to 2-SAT which is known to be linear-time solvable [4].
Theorem 2. REACHABLE OBJECT on paths can be solved in O(n4) time.
Proof. For each object z of type n− I (there are O(n) many), we do the following. First, compute the type, subtype
and block of each object and use Lemma 10 to compute two possible selections for each block in overallO(n2) time.
Second, compute in O(n3) time pairs of selections compatible to each other. Third, check in O(n3) time whether
these selections are consistent.
If some selection s for a block B is not consistent or if there is some other block C such that s is not compatible
with either selection for C, then we know we have to take the other possible selection s′ for B and can therefore
ignore all selections that are in conflict with s′. If this rules out some selection, then we can repeat the process. After
at most n rounds of which each only takes O(n) time, we arrive at a situation where there are exactly two consistent
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selections for each block and the task is to find a set of pairwise compatible selections that include a selection for each
block. We finally reduce this problem to a 2-SAT formula.
We start with a variable vB for each block B which is set to true if we move all objects of subtype r to the right
and false otherwise. For each pair s, s′ of selections that are in conflict with one another, let B be the block of s and C
be the block of s′. Without loss of generality, let s and s′ be the selections that are represented by vB , vC being set
to true (otherwise swap ¬vB with vB or ¬vC with vC in the following clause). Since we cannot select s and s′ at the
same time, we add a clause (¬vB ∨ ¬vC) to our 2-SAT formula.
Observe that if there is a set of pairwise non-conflicting selections, then the 2-SAT formula is satisfied by the corre-
sponding assignment of the variables and if the formula is satisfied, then this assignment corresponds to a solution to
the original REACHABLE OBJECT-instance. Since 2-SAT can be solved in linear time [4] and the constructed formula
has O(n2) clauses of constant size, our statement follows.
We conclude by conjecturing that the case when the underlying graph is a cycle can also be solved in polynomial time.
The idea is similar to the case of a path. The main difference is that it may happen that some objects may be swapped
with x twice. Since we “guess” the object z that is last swapped with x (and we can also “guess” the moving direction
of x in a similar fashion), we can compute the first edge where x and z are swapped. This determines the number k
of objects which initially start between x and z and are also required to swap twice with x in any solution. We then
apply the same type-based arguments as in the proof for paths, but we incorporate the additional information that the
objects of types 1, . . . , k + 1 that are swapped with x are also the objects with the last (largest) k + 1 types that are
swapped with x.
4 Preferences of Length at Most Four
In this section we investigate the case where we do not impose any restriction on the underlying social network,
i.e., it is a complete graph. We find that REACHABLE OBJECT remains NP-complete in this case. This implies that
the computational hardness of the problem does not stem from restricting the possible swaps between agents by an
underlying social network. Moreover, the hardness holds even if each agent has at most four objects in her preference
list. To show NP-hardness, we reduce from a restricted NP-complete variant of the 3-SAT problem [17]. In this
variant, each clause has either 2 or 3 literals, and each variable appears once as a negative literal and either once or
twice as a positive literal. We note that in the original NP-hardness reduction by Gourve`s et al. [11], the lengths of the
preference lists are unbounded.
Theorem 3. REACHABLE OBJECT is NP-complete on complete graphs, even if each preference list has length at most
four.
Proof. We only focus on the hardness reduction as containment in NP is shown in Proposition 1. We reduce from the
restricted 3-SAT variant mentioned in the beginning of the section. The general idea of the reduction is to introduce
for each literal of a clause a pair of private clause agents to pass through the target object if the corresponding literal
is set to true and to introduce for each variable some variable agents to make sure that no two pairs of private clause
agents for which the corresponding literals are complement to each other will pass through the target object in the
same sequence of swaps. In this way, we can identify a satisfying truth assignment if and only if there is a sequence
of swaps that makes the target object reach our agent. Let φ = (V , C) be an instance of the restricted 3-SAT problem
with variables V = {v1, . . . , vn} and clauses C = {C1, . . . , Cm}. For each variable vi ∈ V , let occ(i) be the number
of occurrences of variable vi (note that occ(i) ∈ {2, 3}), let ν(i) denote the index of the clause that contains the
negative literal vi, and let π1(i) and π2(i) be the indices of the clauses with π1(i) < π2(i) that contain the positive
literal vi; if vi only appears twice in φ, then we simply neglect π2(i). Now, we construct an instance of REACHABLE
OBJECT as follows.
Agents and Initial Assignment σ0. For each variable vi ∈ V , introduce occ(i)−1 variable agents, denoted as Xzi
with initial objects x
occ(i)−z
i , z ∈ {1, . . . , occ(i)−1}. For each clause Cj ∈ C, introduce 2|Cj | + 1 clause agents,
denoted as Aj , B
z
j , andD
z
j , z ∈ {1, . . . , |Cj |}, where |Cj | denotes the number of literals contained in Cj . The initial
objects of Bzj , andD
z
j are b
z
j , and d
z
j , respectively. The initial object of A1 is our target object x and the initial object
of Aj , j ≥ 2, is aj−1. Finally, our target agent I initially holds object am.
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Preference Lists. For each clause Cj ∈ C, we use an arbitrary but fixed order of the literals in Cj to define a bijective
function fj : Cj → {1, . . . , |Cj |}, which assigns to each literal contained in Cj a distinct number from {1, . . . , |Cj |}.
(1) For each variable vi ∈ V , let j = ν(i), j′ = π1(i) (and j′′ = π2(i) if occ(i) = 3) and do the following:
(i) If occ(i) = 2, thenX1i has preference list
d
fj′ (vi)
j′ ≻ d
fj(vi)
j ≻ x
1
i .
(ii) If occ(i) = 3, then the preference lists ofX1i andX
2
i are
X1i : d
fj′ (vi)
j′ ≻ x
1
i ≻ d
fj(vi)
j ≻ x
2
i ,
X2i : d
fj′′ (vi)
j′′ ≻ x
2
i ≻ x
1
i .
(2) We define an auxiliary function to identify an object for each clause Cj ∈ C and each literal ℓ ∈ Cj contained
in Cj :
τ(Cj , ℓ) :=


x1i , if occ(i) = 2 and ℓ = vi for some variable vi,
x2i , if occ(i) = 3 and ℓ = vi for some variable vi,
x1i , if ℓ = vi and j = π1(i) for some variable vi,
x2i , if ℓ = vi and j = π2(i) for some variable vi.
The preference lists of the clause agents corresponding to C1 are:
A1 : b
1
1 ≻ · · · ≻ b
|C1|
1 ≻ x .
For each literal ℓ ∈ C1, the preference lists of B
f1(ℓ)
1 andD
f1(ℓ)
1 are
B
f1(ℓ)
1 : τ(C1, ℓ) ≻ x ≻ b
f1(ℓ)
1 , and
D
f1(ℓ)
1 : a1 ≻ x ≻ τ(C1, ℓ) ≻ d
f1(ℓ)
1 .
For each index j ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, the preference lists of the clause agents corresponding to Cj are
Aj : b
1
j ≻ · · · ≻ b
|Cj|
j ≻ aj−1 ,
B
fj(ℓ)
j : τ(Cj , ℓ) ≻ x ≻ aj−1 ≻ b
fj(ℓ)
j , and
for all ℓ ∈ Cj , let D
fj(ℓ)
j : aj ≻ x ≻ τ(Cj , ℓ) ≻ d
fj(ℓ)
j .
(3) Let the preference list of our target agent I be x ≻ am .
To finish the construction, we let the underlying graph be complete. One can verify that the constructed preference
lists have length at most four.
The underlying graph G = (V,
(
V
2
)
). All agents are pairwise connected by an edge in the underlying graph. By the
definition of rational trades, indeed, we can delete all irrelevant edges, say {u, v}, if u and v will never agree to trade,
i.e., there are no two objects, say i, j, which exist in the preference lists of both u and v such that u prefers i to j while
v prefers j to i. By carefully examining the preference lists of the agents, we observe that only the following edges E
are relevant for V .
(1) For each clause Cj the corresponding vertices form a generalized star with Aj being the center and each leaf D
z
j
having distance two to the center. Formally, for each clause Cj ∈ C and for each two clause agents Bzj , D
z
j with
1 ≤ z ≤ |Cj | let {Aj , Bzj }, {B
z
j , D
z
j } ∈ E.
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A1 : b
1
1 ≻ b
2
1 ≻ x , A2 : b
1
2 ≻ b
2
2 ≻ b
3
2 ≻ a1 , A3 : b
1
3 ≻ b
2
3 ≻ b
3
3 ≻ a2 , A4 : b
1
4 ≻ b
2
4 ≻ a3 ,
B11 : x
1
2 ≻ x ≻ b
1
1 , B
1
2 : x
1
1 ≻ x ≻ a1 ≻ b
1
2 , B
1
3 : x
1
1 ≻ x ≻ a2 ≻ b
1
3 , B
1
4 : x
2
3 ≻ x ≻ a3 ≻ b
1
4 ,
B21 : x
1
3 ≻ x ≻ b
2
1 , B
2
2 : x
2
2 ≻ x ≻ a1 ≻ b
2
2 , B
2
3 : x
2
2 ≻ x ≻ a2 ≻ b
2
3 , B
2
4 : x
1
4 ≻ x ≻ a3 ≻ b
2
4 ,
B32 : x
2
3 ≻ x ≻ a1 ≻ b
3
2 , B
3
3 : x
1
4 ≻ x ≻ a2 ≻ b
3
3 ,
D11 : a1 ≻ x ≻ x
1
2 ≻ d
1
1 , D
1
2 : a2 ≻ x ≻ x
1
1 ≻ d
1
2 , D
1
3 : a3 ≻ x ≻ x
1
1 ≻ d
1
3 , D
1
4 : a4 ≻ x ≻ x
2
3 ≻ d
1
4 ,
D21 : a1 ≻ x ≻ x
1
3 ≻ d
2
1 , D
2
2 : a2 ≻ x ≻ x
2
2 ≻ d
2
2 , D
2
3 : a3 ≻ x ≻ x
2
2 ≻ d
2
3 , D
2
4 : a4 ≻ x ≻ x
1
4 ≻ d
2
4 ,
D32 : a2 ≻ x ≻ x
2
3 ≻ d
3
2 , D
3
3 : a3 ≻ x ≻ x
1
4 ≻ d
3
3 ,
I : x ≻ a4 ,
X11 : d
1
2 ≻ d
1
3 ≻ x
1
1 , X
1
2 : d
1
1 ≻ x
1
2 ≻ d
2
2 ≻ x
2
2 , X
1
3 : d
2
1 ≻ x
1
3 ≻ d
3
2 ≻ x
2
3 , X
1
4 : d
3
3 ≻ d
2
4 ≻ x
1
4 ,
X22 : d
2
3 ≻ x
2
2 ≻ x
1
2 , X
2
3 : d
1
4 ≻ x
2
3 ≻ x
1
3 . (of Example 1) ⋄
(2) For each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1}, the two vertex sets {Dzj | 1 ≤ z ≤ |Cj |} and {B
z′
j+1 | 1 ≤ z
′ ≤ |Cj+1|} form a
complete bipartite graph. Formally, for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1}, and for each two clause agents Dzj and B
z′
j+1
with 1 ≤ z ≤ |Cj | and 1 ≤ z′ ≤ |Cj+1|, let {Dzj , B
z′
j+1} ∈ E.
(3) To connect the clause agents and variable agents, for each variable vi ∈ V , we do the following.
(a) If occ(i) = 2, then add {X1i , B
fj′ (vi)
j′ } and {X
1
i , B
fj(vi)
j } to E, where j = ν(i) and j
′ = π1(i).
(b) If occ(i) = 3, then add {X1i , B
fj′ (vi)
j′ }, {X
1
i , B
fj(vi)
j }, {X
2
i , B
fj′′ (vi)
j′′ }, and {X
1
i , X
2
i } to E, where j = ν(i),
j′ = π1(i), and j
′′ = π2(i).
(4) Our target agent I is adjacent to all clause agentsDzm, z ∈ {1, . . . , |Cm|}.
Example 1. For an illustration of the construction, let us consider the following restricted 3-SAT instance:
V = {v1, v2, v3, v4},C = {C1 = (v2 ∨ v3), C2 = (v1 ∨ v2 ∨ v3), C3 = (v1 ∨ v2 ∨ v4), C4 = (v3 ∨ v4)}.
Our instance for REACHABLE OBJECT contains the following agents.
V ={A1, B
1
1 , B
2
1 , D
1
1 , D
2
1} ∪ {A2, B
1
2 , B
2
2 , B
3
2 , D
1
2 , D
2
2, D
3
2}∪
{A3, B
1
3 , B
2
3 , B
3
3 , D
1
3, D
2
3, D
3
3} ∪ {A4, B
1
4 , B
2
4 , D
1
4, D
2
4}∪
{X11 , X
1
2 , X
2
2 , X
1
3 , X
2
3 , X
1
4} ∪ {I}.
The preference lists of these agents are
The underlying graph is complete. Nevertheless, only the edges as depicted in Figure 6 turn out to be relevant for
swaps.
Now, we show that instance φ = (V , C), with n variables V andm clauses C, admits a satisfying truth assignment
if and only if object x which agent A1 initially holds is reachable for our agent I which initially holds am.
For the “only if” part, assume that β : V → {true,false} is a satisfying assignment for φ. Intuitively, this
satisfying assignment will guide us to find a sequence of swaps, making object x reach agent I .
First, for each variable vi ∈ V , if occ(i) = 3, implying that there are two variable agents (X1i andX
2
i ) for vi, and
if β(vi) = true, then let agentX
1
i andX
2
i swap their initial objects so thatX
1
i andX
2
i hold x
1
i and x
2
i , respectively.
For each clause Cj , identify a literal, say ℓj , which satisfies Cj under β, and do the following.
1. Let agent Aj and agent B
fj(ℓj)
j swap their initial objects.
2. Let agentD
fj(ℓj)
j and agentX
z
i swap their current objects such that
(a) if ℓj = vi, then z = 1 (note that in this case agent X
1
i is holding object x
1
i if occ(i) = 2, and is holding
object x2i if occ(i) = 3),
(b) if ℓj = vi and j = π1(i), then z = 1 (note that in this case agentX
1
i is holding object x
1
i ), and
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Figure 6: Underlying graph with only relevant edges for the profile constructed according to the reduction given in Theorem 3
(c) if ℓj = vi and j = π2(i), then z = 2 (note that in this case agentX
2
i is holding object x
2
i ).
After these swaps, agent B1 is holding object x. Each agent B
fj(ℓj)
j , 2 ≤ j ≤ m, is holding object aj−1. Each
agent D
fj(ℓj)
j is holding object τ(Cj , ℓj). Now, to let x reach agent I , we let it pass through agents B1, D1, B2, D2,
. . ., Bm, Dm, and finally to I . Formally, iterating from j = 1 to j = m− 1, we do the following:
1. Let agent Bj andDj swap their current objects so that Dj holds object x.
2. Let agentDj and Bj+1 swap their current objects so that Bj+1 holds object.
After these swaps, agent Bm obtains object x. Let agentDm swap its object τ(Dm, ℓm) with agent Bm for object x.
Finally, let agent I swap its object am with agentDm for object x. This completes the proof for the “only if” part.
For the “if” part, assume that there is a sequence of swaps (σ0, σ1, . . . , σs) which makes object x reach agent I ,
i.e. σs(I) = x. Now, we show how to construct a satisfying truth assignment for φ. First, we observe the following
properties which will help us to identify a literal for each clause such that setting it to true will satisfy the clause.
Claim 1. For each clause Cj ∈ C, there exist an assignment σr, 1 ≤ r < s, and a literal ℓj ∈ Cj such that σr admits
a swap for agents B
fj(ℓj)
j andD
fj(ℓj)
j , i.e.
(1) σr(B
fj(ℓj)
j ) = x,
(2) σr(D
fj(ℓj)
j ) = τ(Cj , ℓj),
(3) σr+1(B
fj(ℓj)
j ) = τ(Cj , ℓj), and
(4) σr+1(D
fj(ℓj)
j ) = x.
Proof. In our initial assignment σ0, agent I holds object am. To make object x reach agent I , one can verify that
agent I must have swapped with some clause agent Dzm with z ∈ {1, . . . , |Cm|} since agent I only prefers x to am,
and only agents from {Dtm | 1 ≤ t ≤ |Cm|} are willing to swap x for am. Let ℓm be the literal with fm(ℓm) = z;
recall that fm is a bijection. In order to make agent D
z
m obtain object x, by her preference list, she must be holding
object τ(Cm, ℓm) and swap it for x since no agent will swap with her for d
z
m. Observe that agentB
z
m is the only agent
that prefers τ(Cm, ℓm) to x. It follows that B
z
m must have swapped with D
z
m for object τ(Cm, ℓm). This means that
there must be an assignment σr in the sequence such that
(1) σr(B
z
m) = x,
(2) σr(D
z
m) = τ(Cm, ℓm),
(3) σr+1(B
z
m) = τ(Cm, ℓm), and
(4) σr+1(D
z
m) = x.
Now, we show our statement through induction on the index j of the clause agents, j ≥ 2. Assume that there is an
assignment σrj in the sequence and that Cj contains a literal ℓj such that
(1) σrj (B
fj(ℓj)
j ) = x,
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(2) σrj (D
fj(ℓj)
j ) = τ(Cj , ℓj),
(3) σrj+1(B
fj(ℓj)
j ) = τ(Cj , ℓj), and
(4) σrj+1(D
fj(ℓj)
j ) = x.
By the above assignment, it follows that agent B
fj(ℓj)
j must have swapped with some other agent for object x.
Since agent B
fj(ℓj)
j prefers x only to objects aj−1 and b
fj(ℓj)
j and since no agent prefers b
fj(ℓj)
j to x, it follows that
agent B
fj(ℓj)
j must have swapped with some other agent for x while holding object aj−1. Since only agents from
{Dtj−1 | 1 ≤ t ≤ |Cj−1|} prefer aj−1 to x, it follows that B
fj(ℓj)
j must have swapped with some agent D
zj−1
j−1 with
zj−1 ∈ {1, . . . , |Cj−1|} for object x. Let ℓj−1 be the literal with fj−1(ℓj−1) = zj−1. To perform such a swap,
however, agentD
zj−1
j−1 must first obtain object x. Similarly to the case with agentDm, agentD
zj−1
j−1 must once hold ob-
ject τ(Cj−1, ℓj−1) and swap it for object x since no agent will swap with her for d
zj−1
j−1 . Observe that agentB
zj−1
j−1 is the
only agent that prefers τ(Cj−1 , ℓj−1) to x. It follows that agentD
zj−1
j−1 , while holding object τ(Cj−1, ℓj−1), swapped
with agent B
zj−1
j−1 for object x, i.e. there is an assignment σrj−1 in the sequence and Cj−1 contains a literal ℓj−1 such
that
(1) σrj−1 (B
fj−1(ℓj−1)
j−1 ) = x,
(2) σrj−1 (D
fj−1(ℓj−1)
j−1 ) = τ(Cj−1, ℓj−1),
(3) σrj−1+1(B
fj−1(ℓj−1)
j−1 ) = τ(Cj−1, ℓj−1), and
(4) σrj−1+1(D
fj−1(ℓj−1)
j−1 ) = x. (of Claim 1) ⋄
By the above claim, we can now define a truth assignment β for φ.
For all vi ∈ V , let β(vi) :=


false, if D
fj(vi)
j swapped with
B
fj(vi)
j for x, where j = ν(i),
true, otherwise.
Recall that in φ each variable appears exactly once as a negative literal. Thus, our β is a well-defined truth assignment.
To show that β is indeed a satisfying assignment, suppose, towards a contradiction, that β does not satisfy some
clause Cj ∈ C. By Claim 1, let ℓj ∈ Cj be a literal such that D
fj(ℓj)
j , while holding object τ(Cj , ℓj), swapped with
B
fj(ℓj)
j for x. Observe that ℓj ∈ {vi, vi} for some vi ∈ V . We distinguish between two cases, in each of which we
will arrive at a contradiction.
Case 1: ℓj = vi. This implies that vi ∈ Cj , j = ν(i). Thus, D
fj(vi)
j swapped with B
fj(vi)
j for x. By our definition
of β it follows that β(vi) = false which satisfies Cj–a contradiction.
Case 2: ℓj = vi. This implies that vi ∈ Cj . SinceCj is not satisfied by β it follows that vi /∈ Cj and β(vi) = false.
By our definition of β it follows that D
fj′ (vi)
j′ , while holding object τ(Cj′ , vi) swapped with B
fj′ (vi)
j′ for x where
j′ = ν(i) and j′ 6= j.
If occ(i) = 2, implying that there is exactly one variable agent, namely X1i for vi, then by our definition of τ
it follows that τ(Cj , vi) = τ(Cj′ , vi) = x
1
i . To be able to swap away object x
1
i , agent D
fj′ (vi)
j′ needs to obtain it
from agentX1i since d
fj′ (vi)
j′ is the only object to which agentD
fj′ (vi)
j′ prefers x
1
i and sinceX
1
i is the only agent who
prefers d
fj′ (vi)
j′ to x
1
i . This implies that agentD
fj(vi)
j did not obtain object x
1
i from agentX
1
i , and hence did not hold
object x1i during the whole swap sequence. However, since x
1
i is the only object that agent B
fj(ℓj)
j prefers to x, it
follows that agentD
f(j)(vi)
j has not swapped with B
fj(ℓj)
j for x—a contradiction to our assumption above (before the
case study).
Analogously, if occ(i) = 3, implying that there are exactly two variable agents, namely X1i and X
2
i for vi, then
by the definition of τ it follows that τ(Cj′ , vi) = x
2
i . By a similar reasoning as in the case of occ(i) = 2, it follows
that X1i did not swap with any other agent for object x
1
i as this would require her to swap her initial object x
2
i which
she gave away for d
fj′ (vi)
j′ . Consequently, agent D
fj(vi)
j would not have swapped either with agent X
1
i for object x
1
i
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Figure 7: Illustration of the construction in the proof of Theorem 4 showing one variable gadget (bottom) for representing the
assignment of one variable and the “clause path” (top) that verifies whether some assignment satisfies the input formula φ.
or with agent X2i for object x
1
i –a contradiction to our initial assumption that D
fj(vi)
j swapped away τ(Cj , xi) which
is either x1i or x
2
i . This completes the “if” part.
5 Generalized Caterpillars
We obtain NP-hardness for REACHABLE OBJECT on generalized caterpillars where each hair has length at most
two and only one vertex has degree larger than two. This strengthens the NP-hardness of REACHABLE OBJECT on
trees [11] (their constructed tree is a generalized caterpillar where each hair has length three and there is only one
vertex of degree larger than two).
For the sake of completeness, we give a full proof including parts of the original proof by Gourve`s et al. [11].
Theorem 4. REACHABLE OBJECT is NP-hard on generalized caterpillars where each hair has length at most two
and only one vertex has degree larger than two.
Proof. We use the same notation as Gourve`s et al. [11]. Let φ = (V , C) be an instance of TWO POSITIVE ONE NEG-
ATIVE AT MOST 3-SAT with variable set V = {v1, . . . , vn} and clause set C = {C1, . . . , Cm}. For each variable vi,
let pi1, p
i
2 and n
i denote the clause in which vi occurs first as a positive literal, second as a positive literal and as a
negative literal, respectively. Accordingly, we denote the respective literal of vi by v
pi1
i , v
pi2
i or v¯
ni
i .
The instance of REACHABLE OBJECT is constructed as follows. For each variable vi, we add a “variable gad-
get” consisting of nine agents X¯n
i
i , X
pi1
i , X
pi2
i , D
1
i , D
2
i , P
1
i , P
2
i , Ni, and Hi. For each clause Ci, we add one “clause
agent” Ci and we add an additional agent T which starts with an object t. We ask whether agent Cm can get object t.
The underlying graph is depicted in Figure 7. The preference lists of the agents are as follows:
D1i : vi ≻ −i ≻ +i ,
D2i : +i ≻ −i ,
X
pi1
i : cm−pi1+1 ≻ x
pi1
i ≻ +i ≻ ++i ,
P 1i : +i ≻ x
pi1
i ,
X
pi2
i : cm−pi2+1 ≻ x
pi2
i ≻ ++i ≻ pi ,
P 2i : ++i ≻ x
pi2
i ,
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X¯n
i
i : cm−pin+1 ≻ x¯
ni
i ≻ −i ≻ ni ,
Ni : −i ≻ x¯n
i
i ,
Hn : pn ≻ nn ≻ cm ,
Hi : pi ≻ ni ≻ vi+1 ,
Cm : t ≻ {ℓm} ≻ c1 ≻ {ℓm−1} ≻ . . . ≻ cm−1 ≻ {ℓ1} ≻ cm ≻
pn ≻ nn ≻ −n ≻ ++n ≻ +n ≻ vn ≻
pn−1 ≻ nn−1 ≻ . . . ≻ +1 ≻ v1 ,
Cj : {ℓj+1} ≻ t ≻ {ℓj} ≻ c1 ≻ {ℓj−1} ≻ . . . ≻ cj−1 ≻ {ℓ1} ≻ cj ,
T : {ℓ1} ≻ t ,
where {ℓj} is the set of all literal objects corresponding to the literals in Cj ranked in arbitrary order.
We start by showing that the variable gadgets work properly, that is, each variable is either set to true or false
and the different literal objects can be used in an arbitrary order. Consider a variable vi and note the following:
• D1i can only give either +i or −i to Cm,
• Ni will only release x¯n
i
i in exchange for −i,
• P 1i will only release x
pi1
i in exchange for +i, and
• P 2i will only release x
pi2
i in exchange for ++i.
Furthermore, observe that we cannot use cm−pi1+1 to release ++i from X
pi1
i since agent Cm prefers cm−pi1+1
over ++i. Hence, agent Cm can only receive either the “negative token” x¯
ni
i or positive “token(s)” x
pi1
i and/or x
pi2
i .
Once D1i and D
2
i have decided on whether +i or −i is traded in exchange for vi, agent Cm trades either
with X
pi1
i , X
pi2
i and Hi or with X¯
ni
i and Hi in this order. Afterwards, either X
pi1
i and P
1
i (and also X
pi2
i and P
2
i )
can swap or X¯n
i
i and Ni can swap their current objects. Thus, after fixing all variable gadgets, agent Cm holds the
object cm and can swap it with one of the agentsX
pi1
i , X
pi2
i or X¯
ni
i .
The remainder of the proof works exactly as the proof of Gourve`s et al. [11, Theorem 1]. Once each variable is
assigned a truth value, the path of clause agents verifies that each clause is satisfied by this assignment. To this end, first
notice that each clause agent Cj (excluding Cm) prefers t over her initial object cj and only accepts to swap t for an
object in {ℓj+1}. Hence, the only way to move t from T to Cm−1 involves giving each agent Ci (again excludingCm)
an object associated with a literal that satisfies the clause Ci+1. Finally, observe that the first and last clauses also need
to be satisfied in order for T and Cm−1 to give away t. Thus, if there is a sequence of swaps such that Cm gets t in the
end, then φ is satisfiable.
If φ is satisfiable, then there is a sequence of swaps such that Cm gets t: We first iterate over all variable gadgets
and set their value according to some satisfying assignment for φ. Once this is done, agent Cm has object cm and can
now trade this for an object corresponding to a literal that satisfies clause C1. This object is then passed to agent T
such that Cm has object cm−1 which can again be swapped for an object representing a satisfying literal for clause C2.
This object is then passed to agent C1 and this procedure is repeated until t reaches Cm.
6 Conclusion
We investigated the computational complexity of REACHABLE OBJECT with respect to different restrictions regarding
the underlying graph and the agent preferences. Our work narrows the gap between known tractable and intractable
cases leading to a comprehensive understanding of the complexity of REACHABLE OBJECT. In particular, we settled
the complexity with respect to the preference lengths.
Several questions remain open: Can REACHABLE OBJECT be solved in polynomial time on caterpillars? Note
that on stars REACHABLE OBJECT can be solved in polynomial time [11, Proposition 1]). Also, the complexity of
REACHABLE OBJECT on graphs of maximum degree three is open. Saffidine andWilczynski [14, Theorem 4] showed
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NP-hardness of REACHABLE OBJECT on graphs of maximum degree four, while our results imply polynomial-time
solvability of REACHABLE OBJECT on graphs of maximum degree two. (Note that a graph of maximum degree two is
the disjoint union of paths and cycles, and note that we provide an efficient algorithm for paths and sketch an adaption
for cycles at the end of Section 3.) Regarding preference restrictions, following the line of studying stable matchings
on restricted domains [6], it would be interesting to know whether assuming a special preference structure can help in
finding tractable cases for our problem. Finally, one may combine resource allocation with social welfare, measured
by the egalitarian or utilitarian cost [9], and study the parameterized complexity of finding a reachable assignment
which meets these criteria as studied in the context of stable matchings [8].
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Complexity group, TU Berlin, held at Darlingerode, Harz, March 2018.
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